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Abstract—In the presence of security countermeasures, a
malware designed for data exfiltration must use a covert channel
to achieve its goal. The Domain Name System (DNS) protocol is
a covert channel commonly used by malware developers today
for this purpose. Although the detection of covert channels using
the DNS has been studied for the past decade, prior research has
largely dealt with a specific subclass of covert channels, namely
DNS tunneling. While the importance of tunneling detection
should not be minimized, an entire class of low throughput DNS
exfiltration malware has been overlooked.
In this study we propose a method for detecting both
tunneling and low throughput data exfiltration over the DNS.
After determining that previously detected malware used Internet
domains that were registered towards a cyber-campaign rather
than compromising existing legitimate ones, we focus on detecting
and denying requests to these domains as an effective data leakage
shutdown. Therefore, our proposed solution handles streaming
DNS traffic in order to detect and automatically deny requests
to domains that are used for data exchange. The initial data
collection phase collects DNS logs per domain in a manner that
permits scanning for long periods of time, and is thus capable of
dealing with “low and slow” attacks. The second phase extracts
features based on the querying behavior of each domain, and
in the last phase an anomaly detection model is used to classify
domains based on their use for data exfiltration. As for detection,
DNS requests to domains that were classified as being used for
data exfiltration will be denied indefinitely.
Our method was evaluated on a large-scale recursive DNS
server’s logs with a peaking high of 47 million requests per
hour. Within these DNS logs, we injected data exfiltration traffic
from DNS tunneling tools as well as two real-life malware:
FrameworkPOS, previously used for the theft of 56M credit cards
from Home Depot in 2014, and Backdoor.Win32.Denis, which was
active in the Cobalt Kitty APT in 2016. Even when restricting our
method to an extremely low false positive rate (i.e., one in fifty
thousand domains), it detected all of the above. In addition, the
logs are used to compare our system with two recently published
methods that focus on detecting DNS tunneling in order to stress
the novelty of detecting low throughput exfiltration malware.
Keywords—DNS, Data Exfiltration, DNS Tunneling, Anomaly
Detection, Isolation Forest
I. INTRODUCTION
Personal computers and computer networks have been the
targets of data theft attacks commonly using techniques in-
volving man-in-the-middle attacks [7] or a malware that leaks
data over a covert channel [25], [40]. In the case of a malware,
usually, a remote server, which acts as a command and control
(C&C), waits for communications from the malware and logs
the data transferred to it. However, in protected networks
(private or organizational) the targeted hosts can reside in
a restricted segment with limited access to/from the outside
world. In such cases, even if connections are allowed, they
are typically monitored by security solutions for suspicious
behavior. Therefore, in such cases it is necessary for the
malware to find a covert channel for the exfiltration of data
to the remote server that will not be blocked or detected by
the existing security solutions. One channel used for achieving
this goal is the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol which
is the focus of this study.
Any communication from local computers to the Internet
(excluding static-IP based communications) relies on the DNS
service. For that reason, restricting DNS communication may
result in the disconnection of legitimate remote services; there-
fore, the DNS must be conservatively used to block content.
From an attacker’s perspective, this makes the DNS protocol
a good candidate as a covert communication channel for data
leakage [3].
Typically, the DNS protocol was not designed for arbi-
trary data exchange; DNS messages are relatively short and
responses are uncorrelated which means that they do not
necessarily arrive in the same order as the corresponding
requests were sent [27]. These limitations can be dealt with
by an attacker using one of two approaches: (1) establishing a
bidirectional communication channel on top of the DNS (e.g.,
by emulating a reliable session between the malware and the
C&C server), or (2) using the channel to send small data
points with minimal overhead and requests that are short and
independent (e.g., credit card numbers, user credentials, key-
logging and geographical locations). We refer to these two
approaches as high throughput tunneling and low throughput
malware, respectively. The complete threat landscape of DNS
exfiltration is comprised of these two classes, and therefore,
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any solution for detecting or preventing data leakage over the
DNS protocol must deal with both of them.
The problem of detecting covert channels has been widely
studied in the last decade, both on a general level [9], [14],
and on the DNS level [5], [6], [13], [16], [18], [36], [39].
However, to the best of our knowledge, previous work has
mainly only focused on detecting the high throughput DNS
tunneling communication class. While the case of tunnel-
ing is important, pursuing its unique characteristics, i.e., bi-
directional data exchange and high throughput, may limit the
ability of the proposed methods to detect the class of low
throughput malware communication. Our survey indicates that
there are at least ten known malware families using DNS
exfiltration that have been overlooked entirely. When used
in recent attacks, such low throughput exfiltration malware
enabled credit card theft [20], the control of compromised
machines [1], and the installation of other malware [4], and
thus their importance must not be underestimated.
Low throughput exfiltration malware detected in recent
years used Internet domains that were purchased, registered,
and operated solely for the sake of their cyber campaign (see
subsection II-C). This is also the case for DNS tunneling
tools in which a user is required to provide and configure an
Internet domain. Therefore, denying requests to these domains
is equivalent to stopping the data leakage without affecting
normal network operation.
In this work we propose a novel DNS exfiltration detection
approach based on machine learning techniques, which targets
both DNS tunneling and low throughput malware exfiltration.
The input for our approach is a stream of DNS traffic logs
that are constantly grouped by domain. The logs are collected
over a sufficiently long period of time to allow the detection
of malware even if its data exchange rate is relatively slow.
Periodically, a feature extraction phase is applied to the col-
lected logs of each domain. Afterwards, a classification phase
is performed on the features of each domain to determine if
the domain is used for data exchange. The classification is
performed using the Isolation Forest [21] anomaly detection
model which is trained on legitimate traffic beforehand. Im-
mediately after the classification, requests to any domain that
has been classified as anomalous (i.e., used for data-exchange)
will be blocked indefinitely, thus stopping the data leakage.
We evaluate our work using both tunneling tools and traffic
simulations of previously detected low throughput exfiltration
malware. These simulations are performed alongside legitimate
large-scale DNS traffic with a peaking rate of 41 million
requests per hour, thereby making the detection task as realistic
as possible. After establishing detection coverage against these
test subjects with less than 0.002% false positive rates as well
as a low increase in false positives over time, we compare our
proposed method to two recently published papers aimed at
detecting tunneling, in order to demonstrate our method’s novel
contribution — detecting low throughput exfiltration malware.
The contribution of our work is three fold:
1) In addition to the detection of DNS tunneling, our work
is capable of detecting low throughput DNS exfiltration
malware.
2) Because our method classifies domains within a specific
time frame (referred to as per domain), it performs the
immediate, accurate, and automated blocking of emerging
DNS data leakage attempts by denying requests to a
domain that was classified as having been used for data
exchange. Arguably, this is not the case for detection
systems that classify users within a specific time frame
(referred to as per user), since indefinite blocking of
a legitimate user’s traffic based on the existence of a
malware might be unacceptable.
3) To the best our knowledge, prior research has not been
evaluated on large-scale, high quality DNS traffic logs
(i.e., more than 106 queries/hour). Since data exfiltration
over the DNS may attempt to operate under the radar,
testing against large-scale traffic is possibly the ultimate
challenge for any detection system. The former claim is
supported as when comparing our proposed method to
previously suggested methods that were not necessarily
designed for large-scale traffic, we see a reduction in their
reported results.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
contains a description of DNS exfiltration to allow greater
understanding of our solution and its analysis. Section III
presents the current state of research in the field. Our proposed
method and its evaluation are presented in Sections IV and V
respectively. The paper concludes with a discussion (Section
VI) and our conclusions and plans for future work (Section
VII).
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we briefly describe the DNS protocol (II-A),
how it can be abused for data exchange (II-B), how the abuse
landscape includes both malicious and legitimate usage (II-C),
and how per domain classification instead of per user or per
series of packets (referred to as per time) can be used to block
malicious use (II-D). In the last subsection we discuss the
challenge of uncovering low throughput malware traffic (II-E).
A. The DNS Protocol
The DNS protocol is a naming system for host machines
and an essential component in the functionality of the Internet.
The vast number of domains and subdomains on the Internet
today exceeds the storage capabilities of a small, simple
database. This was foreseen by the designers of the DNS,
and the system was designed as a hierarchical distributed
database. The resolution of a domain name to the IP address
of its host machine starts by querying the root DNS servers
(i.e. the head of the hierarchy) in a top-down manner until
reaching a designated server called an authoritative name
server (AuthNS).
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The authoritative name servers assigned to a domain name
are responsible for resolving all of its descendants (i.e.,
subdomains). For example, if the login.example.com domain
is queried, the DNS resolver will look for the AuthNS of
example.com by querying the .com suffix. It will then query the
AuthNS of example.com for the domain login.example.com
and receive the answer (if it exists). While allowing scalability,
the decentralization of the DNS allows any user to configure
the authoritative name server for their own domain names.
Such a configuration is the foundation of the potential abuse
of the DNS protocol towards the exchange of data.
B. Data Exchange over the DNS Protocol
The DNS is designed as a stateless protocol for exchanging
very short and specific types of information. At no point was
this protocol meant to carry information from the client to the
server interactively. However, the AuthNS sees all queries from
the clients to the domains delegated to it, and if the queries
follow a certain pattern, the requested subdomain can be
interpreted as data. For example, if the passw0rd.example.com
domain was queried, the AuthNS for example.com effectively
receives the ”passw0rd” string and can interpret it as incoming
data.
In addition to the ability to send data to the AuthNS as
described above, one can also leverage the response to form
a bidirectional interactive data channel (see general scheme
in Figure 1). Therefore, for the low cost of purchasing a
domain and configuring a server as its AuthNS, an attacker can
abuse the DNS, enabling it to serve as a de facto interactive
communication channel between a querying machine and the
server.
Fig. 1. A general scheme for data exchange over the DNS protocol. The
specific example portrays an attack in which a user password hosted on a
compromised machine is unwillingly sent to an attacker via a DNS query.
This type of abuse of the DNS protocol for the sake of data
exchange has been thoroughly studied in previous research
along with its unique attributes [16], [18], [36]. The most
commonly investigated unique attributes are: long queries and
responses [36], different resource record distribution [18], and
a high volume of requests and encoded data rather than plain
text [16]. While these abnormalities may capture the entire
landscape of data exchange over the DNS, they are insufficient
for accurate data leakage detection, since not all data exchange
is malicious.
C. The Landscape of Data Exchange over the DNS
The scheme presented in subsection II-B allows us to define
the domains that are used for data exchange over the DNS.
Formally, a domain for which any subquery contains a data
payload to be delivered to its authoritative name server is
considered a domain used for data exchange over the DNS. For
example, the sophosxl.net domain. (Sophos Extensible List 1)
has sub queries containing reversed IP addresses in the form
of 1.1.168.192.ip.07.s.sophosxl.net. which are designed to be
extracted by Sophos’ authoritative name servers and responded
to with an IP address if they appear in Sophos IP reputation
systems. The fact that this method of operation is directed
towards anti spam shows that data exchange over the DNS is
not necessarily malicious.
Indeed, the landscape of domain names contains both
legitimate and malicious domains. While the sophosxl.net
domain mentioned above is a legitimate example, the 29a.de
domain was formerly registered and used by BernhardPOS,
a point of sale malware, in order to deliver stolen credit
cards in the form of: PzMnPiosOD4nOCwuOzomPS4nN-
jovPS8uOzsnNCstODkjOCwoMwAA.29a.de. The existence of
both malicious and legitimate primary domains with regards
to data exchange over the DNS may impose a distinguishing
challenge if a domain belongs to both groups.
Fortunately, this challenge has not yet been met. Pre-
viously detected malware used Internet domains that were
registered and operated solely for the purpose of data leakage
and were never used legitimately (see Table I). The set of
Internet domains used by these malware is comprised of either
short domain names, to allow maximal bandwidth under the
255 byte per query limitation (e.g., 29a.de.), or the false
imitation of known brands, to allow better “hiding in plain
sight” (e.g., a23-33-37-54-deploy-akamaitechnlogies.com. is
using the Combsquatting [19] scheme and does not belong to
Akamai Technologies, Inc.). Given that any domain is either
malicious or benign but not both, subsection II-D explains how
detected malicious domains can be blocked.
TABLE I. DNS EXFILTRATION MALWARE
Year Malware Name Targets Domains Used
2011 Morto [29] RDP / RAT
ms[.]jifr[.]co[.]cc,
ms[.]jifr[.]net [37]
2011 FeederBot [11] Botnet images[.]moviedyear[.]net [10]
2014 PlugX [31] RDP / RAT ns4[.]msftncsl[.]com [38]
2014 FrameworkPOS [32] POS
a23-33-37-54-deploy-
akamaitechnologies[.]com [26]
2015 Wekby [17] Targeted ns1[.]logitech-usa[.]com [17]
2015 BernhardPOS [28] POS 29a[.]de [28]
2015 JAKU [2] Botnet LS4[.]com [2]
2016 MULTIGRAIN [23] POS dojfgj[.]com [34]
2017 DNSMessenger [4] Targeted cspg[.]pw, algew[.]me [4]
The domains in use by previously detected malware.
1https://community.sophos.com/kb/en-us/31563
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D. Blocking Malicious Data Exchange
Although the existence of seven known malware over the
course of a decade may not lead one to believe that there is
a vast amount of data leakage taking place over the DNS,
the damage caused by these attacks cannot be minimized.
Therefore, any data leakage detection system is measured on
its ability to report data leakage that has occurred, as well as
block emerging data leakage.
The automated blocking of a domain upon detection can
be implemented by denying DNS requests to any descendant
of that domain (i.e., returning a non-existent or server failure
response) or by not answering at all. Blocking by denying re-
quests is a common feature on most network security products
(e.g., firewalls, secure DNS resolvers) which is largely enabled
by a simple record change. This ease of acting on a threat right
after its detection is not as straightforward for other DNS data
leakage detection systems that act upon specific user traffic or
per time, as the consistent use of legitimate services over the
DNS may make it over-sensitive (e.g., queries to *.sophosxl.net
at time t will trigger an alert). Given that, we suggest that a
per domain classification approach exceeds per user or per time
approaches with regard to detection and blocking accuracy.
E. Low Throughput Data Exchange
After confirming the potential of blocking malicious do-
mains based on traffic abnormality, we focus on the time frame
in which the traffic is observed. For the case of high throughput
DNS tunneling tools (see Table II), observing up to an hour of
DNS traffic may suffice. However, for low throughput malware
exfiltration, this may not be sufficient.
TABLE II. HIGH THROUGHPUT TUNNELING TOOLS
Year Tunnel Tool Platform
2000 NSTX Linux
2004 OzymanDNS Linux (Perl)
2006 Iodine Protocol v5.02 Linux, Windows, Mac OS X
2008 TCP-Over-DNS Linux, Windows, Solaris
2008 Split-brain Linux
2009 Dns2tcp Linux, Windows
2009 Heyoka Windows
2010 DNScat2 Linux, Windows
2012 MagicTunnel Android
2012 Element53 Android
2015 YourFreedom Linux, Windows, Mac OS X
2016 VPN-Over-DNS Android
A list of known DNS tunneling tools
Non-interactive data leakage channels (e.g., one-way credit
card sending) may contain shorter messages and use a slower
rate compared to a two-way interactive channel. Therefore,
addressing this threat by inspecting a short time-window of
traffic (e.g., an hour) might be insufficient for a designed
detection algorithm. Instead, we suggest that any data leakage
detection system should facilitate the efficient scanning of
recent traffic with as few memory and disk limitations as
possible. One way to tackle this problem is by using a sliding
window approach, so that data is not recollected frequently.
A combination of the sliding window approach and the per
domain approach can promote data collection efficiency (i.e.,
each log is collected once), and the detection range can be
increased as mush as possible given the system’s memory and
disk usage. This makes the system capable of detecting even
the “lowest and slowest” DNS exfiltration malware.
III. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, research conducted thus
far has focused on detecting DNS tunneling tools and largely
overlooked low throughput malware communication. The prior
research that mentioned the case of low throughput exfiltration
malware failed to evaluate the approaches proposed on such
cases. In this section we provide a brief review of related prior
work which is summarized in Table III. It is important to note
that none of the previous works evaluated their methods on
malware samples or simulations, and only a few considered
per domain classification in order to provide the immediate
prevention of further leakage following detection.
TABLE III. RELATED WORK SUMMARY
Study Year Samplea Evaluationb Techniquec
Paxson et al. [30] 2013 PD I RB
Kara et al. [18] 2014 PD I RB
Sheridan et al. [36] 2015 PD I RB
Wang et al. [39] 2016 PD - UL
Buczak et al. [5] 2016 PU I+ SL
McCarthy et al. [24] 2016 PD I DT
Homem et al. [16] 2016 PT I+ UL
Cambiaso et al. [6] 2016 PT I UL
Engelstad et al. [13] 2017 PU Mob UL
a PD - per domain, PU - per user, PT - per time (series of packets),
b I - Iodine only, I+ - At least two tunneling tools, Mob - Mobile tunneling
c RB - Rule-based, UL - Unsupervised learning, SL - Supervised Learning,
DT - Decision Theory
Initial research in the field focused on specific DNS tunnel-
ing tools, mainly Iodine. Kara et al. [18] analyze the difference
in the distribution of TXT resource records requests between
popular domains and domains used for tunneling with Iodine.
Later versions of Iodine leverage other types of rich resource
records (e.g., SRV, NULL). Sheridan et al. [36] also focus
on Iodine and rely on the fact that normal DNS usage will
be followed by TCP communication to the resulting domain
IPs. They analyze three scenarios: normal (no attack), passive
Iodine, and active Iodine. They show a clear distinction in the
amount of DNS requests versus TCP activity between the two
scenarios.
The essence of a communication channel is in transferring
data, as noted by Paxson et al. [30], and in light of this,
their scheme is based on collecting the total information sent
per primary domain in terms of characters, query types, and
time difference between requests. This information is then
compressed, and if the result is greater than a certain threshold,
the domain is flagged.
More recent work has focused on less specific tunneling
tools using supervised learning. For example, Buczak et al. [5]
also detect tunneling, although not only Iodine. The proposed
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method uses two different types of PCAP files: with and
without tunneling; the tunneling is performed by one of
three tools. A supervised random forest classifier is used to
differentiate between the two classes. While Buczak et al.
focused on per user detection, Homem et al. [16] focused on
per time (series of packets); in their approach the changes in
mean Shannon entropy between tunneling and benign traffic
are learned. Although these approaches mention the existence
of DNS exfiltration malware, they are only trained on high
throughput DNS tunneling which may result in overfitting and
ineffectiveness against a malware attack.
Based on these limitations, more recent research migrated
away from supervised learning approaches to unsupervised
learning in order to generalize the problem. Cambiaso et
al. [6] use dimensionality reduction and mutual information
to tackle the problem. In their work, higher order statistical
features of the request and response sizes and the difference
between consecutive requests are transformed to two principle
components. Based on these components, a mutual information
measure is computed to detect a “weak independence” relation
between the original higher order statistics which is associ-
ated with tunneling. Other research performed by Engelstad
et al. [13] evaluates two anomaly detection techniques to
detect tunneling over mobile DNS. In their work, a feature
vector corresponds to a user PCAP and their findings show
that OCSVM (one-class SVM) outperforms k-means in this
setting. While offering a generic detection approach for one-
class anomaly detection, only two techniques were considered
(clustering and distance). Both of these studies fall short in
two respects: (1) low throughput exfiltration of data that does
not go over TCP is unlikely to create a major change (or any
change at all) in consecutive samples and (2) focusing on per
time / per user detection requires manual intervention to stop
the data leakage. Thus, the detection rate of these solutions
might be too low for large-scale DNS traffic.
A decision theory based approach for the problem was
presented by McCarthy et al. [24]. Their work proposes a
Markov decision process to infer the network node sensors
to be activated for the detection of DNS exfiltration. This
is done interactively, using a partially observable Markov
decision process (POMDP) on the network graph, in which
nodes correspond to hosts and edges correspond to channels.
While this model is theoretically able to cover all possible
attacks, it requires the ability to set sensors within the network
which is not always possible (e.g., if the security system is
a cloud solution service rather than an on-premise appliance
within the network). Also, although the authors mention the
existence of malware such as the FrameworkPOS, the approach
is evaluated using the DETER testbed on the Iodine DNS
tunneling tool alone, and hence its effectiveness was not proven
on that malware.
Finally, we mention a proposed solution based on a new
standard in which the difference between legitimate and mali-
cious DNS tunneling is emphasized [39]. In this work, Wang
points out that the detection of tunneling is easy enough, since
the volume of requests is high, however the distinction between
types of tunneling is more difficult. He suggests a whitelist in
the form of a legitimate tunneling directory in which reputable
DNS tunneling services must register in advance; unregistered
DNS services would be denied. This solution, if implemented,
would decrease false positive rates for all other solutions.
Although it focuses on the establishment of a post-detection
whitelist, it does not specify a new detection system or discuss
malware.
IV. METHOD
A. Overview
The proposed method presents a constantly running process
aimed at detecting and blocking domains that are queried
in streaming DNS traffic and used for malicious DNS data
exfiltration. First, the streaming DNS traffic is collected and
transformed to feature vectors corresponding to domains. Af-
terwards, a pre-trained one-class classifier is used to detect
domains that exchange data over the DNS. Immediately af-
ter, requests to domains that are classified as used for data
exchange are blocked indefinitely. In the rest of this section
we describe the method in detail, starting with our basic
assumptions (see subsection IV-B) and setting parameters
(see subsection IV-C), to each of the method’s phases (see
subsections IV-D,IV-E, IV-F).
Our method attempts to be as straightforward as possible
to allow its implementation in DNS servers that are not
necessarily designed to perform detection, as long they support
logging the DNS traffic and domain blacklisting (as portrayed
in Figure 2).
Fig. 2. The high level design of a system in which a DNS server outputs
its logs to be grouped as domains, classified as either malicious or benign,
and blocked if classified as malicious. These are the only two requirements of
the DNS server for employing the proposed detection system are DNS traffic
logging and domain blacklisting capabilities.
In addition, the method relies on the capability to deploy
the previously trained model regardless of the environment.
This capability is supportedby selecting only statistical fea-
tures (rates, averages, etc.) for the anomaly detection model,
thereby avoiding non-windowed features such as the number
of requests which may behave differently on different sized
DNS servers. Moreover, the iForest model is serializable as a
collection of binary trees and the anomaly score threshold.
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B. Assumptions
Given the background presented in section II, the method
is based on the following assumptions:
1) DNS Data Exchange Abnormality: based on the general
scheme for data exfiltration (subsection II-B), we establish the
abnormality of DNS traffic when used for data exchange. We
assume that domains that are used for data exchange over the
DNS will likely be characterized with longer than average
requests and responses, encoded payloads (subqueries), and
a plethora of unique requests.
2) Use of a Single Domain: based on recently discovered
malware, we assume that a single domain is used for exfiltra-
tion, thus detecting its querying abnormality and denying its
DNS requests are sufficient for stopping the leakage. A more
complex case of multiple domains is discussed in the future
work section (section VI).
C. Parameters
The proposed method has three tunable parameters (sum-
marized in Table IV).
TABLE IV. PROPOSED METHOD’S PARAMETERS
Name Description Example Value
ν Acceptable rate of false positive domains 2 · 10−5
λ
Frequency of data collection
and classification [minutes]
15
ns
Window size for inspection
(i.e., number of data collection sets)
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The settings of the parameters may influence the detection
rate and its latency. Based on our evaluation, we recommend
the following:
1) Setting ν: A higher acceptable rate of false positives
(denoted as ν) will potentially increase the detection
rate at the cost of additional false positive domains. We
recommend setting it to a value not higher than 0.1% (due
to threat scarcity) and decreasing it to the point when the
acceptable rate of false positive domains to be reviewed
by a security expert is reached. In our false positives
analysis (see Section V-D), setting ν = 2 · 10−5 yielded
only 18 false positives domains on a large-scale DNS
traffic with a peaking rate of 47 million hourly queries
over the course of six days. Moreover, since the number
of false positives domains decreased exponentially since
the start execution, we expect that given a white-listing of
former false positives, the rate would effectively be much
lower.
2) Setting λ: A lower frequency of data collection and
classification (denoted as λ) will allow better detection
latency, e.g., up to λ minutes since exfiltration starts.
However, it will require that the feature extraction be
applied on ns · λ minutes of logs each λ minutes. We
therefore, recommend setting it to as low as the system’s
storage, processing power, and memory allocation.
3) Setting ns: A longer window size of inspection in units
of λ minutes (denoted as ns) allows detecting ”low and
slow” attacks, even if they take place over several hours
(e.g., ten credit card numbers are extracted over a period
of six hours). In the same way as λ, it should be increased
as much as possible within the limitations of storage and
memory.
Moreover, the trade-off between immediate blocking and
detecting a silent attack should be reflected in setting both ns
and λ. For example, a hotel’s secured wireless network that
wishes to focus on blocking unpaid Wi-Fi access based on
DNS tunneling may choose λ = 1, ns = 10, while a point of
sale network may use λ = 60, ns = 10.
D. Data Collection
The main goal of the data collection phase is to generate a
compact representation of per domain traffic that will facilitate
a subsequent efficient feature extraction process.
This phase starts by processing the streaming DNS traffic
every λ minutes and represents each DNS log line as the
following tuple:
〈Q,R, T 〉j ,
such that Q contains the full query name (e.g., google.com.),
R contains the full list of response record values (e.g., 8.8.8.8),
T contains the queried record type (e.g., ”A”), and j is the log
line index. Specifically for the case of non-existent responses
(a.k.a. NXDOMAIN status), R is assigned with an empty
string. Based on this representation we group DNS logs by
primary domains.
A primary domain name is hereby defined as the con-
catenation of the second level domain 2, and top level do-
main 3. For example, for the fully qualified domain name
login.example.org.de. the second level domain is example. and
the top level domain is org.de.; hence the primary domain is
example.org.de.. The main use of a primary domain name is for
domain registration. Therefore, by using it as a sample point
for a classification task it assigns a class for each registration,
and is effective against domains that were registered merely
for malicious acts. The primary domain can be extracted from
each log line (as explained above) using a function, prim, as
follows:
prim (〈Q,R, T 〉j) = Pj
where Pj is the primary domain for the j-th log line. Using the
prim function, log lines can then be grouped by their primary
domain, as well as by their discrete time frame of collection
t:
LPit = {〈Q,R, T 〉j | prim (〈Q,R, T 〉j) = Pi} .
This grouping of DNS logs allows for efficient scanning of
consecutive logs, as each log can be collected once but used ns
times using a sliding window. For example, a log line that will
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-level domain
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Top-level domain
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be collected at time ti will be consumed at times [ti, ..., ti +
ns). This sliding window over the recent ns ·λ minutes proves
to be useful in the feature extraction phase which follows.
E. Feature Extraction
The feature extraction phase works once every λ minutes
on a per domain sliding window, i.e. a combination of the last
ns collected logs:
WPitnow =
{
LPit | tnow − ns <= t < tnow
}
We define a feature extraction function, fe, to transform
a sliding window, WPi , to a feature vector that represents a
specific primary domain in a certain sliding window:
fe
(
WPitnow
)
= 〈Pi, Ent,NI, Uniq, V ol, Len, LMW 〉 , (1)
where each of the following features is a computed function
on the domain Pi in the time frame tnow:
1) E corresponds to the character entropy (see IV-E1),
2) NI corresponds to the non-IP type ratio (see IV-E2),
3) Uniq corresponds to the unique query ratio (see IV-E3),
4) V ol corresponds to the query volume (see IV-E4),
5) Len corresponds to the query average length (see IV-E5,
6) and LMW corresponds to the ratio between the length
of the longest meaningful word and the subdomain length
(see IV-E6).
We now elaborate on these features and how to compute each
of them.
1) Character Entropy: The notion of entropy, or informa-
tion density, can be interpreted as measuring the average un-
certainty of a letter An given {A1, .., An−1} [35]. Generally,
entropy is computed over a discrete random variable X using
the formula:
H(X) = −
n∑
i=1
Pr(xi) · log Pr(xi)
where Pr(xi) is the probability of the i-th symbol of infor-
mation (e.g., a character) in the series X composed of up
to n symbols. Among other uses, entropy is widely used as a
heuristic for the detection of encryption in a stream of bits [12],
[22], [33]. We compute the entropy on per domain queries to
detect encrypted or encoded querying behavior. Formally, if the
random variable X is a series of characters, and the allowed
symbols are the letters, digits and hyphens (LDH) as in the
Request for Comments (RFC) of the DNS protocol [27], then:
H(X) = −
∑
xi∈LDH
Pr(xi) · log Pr(xi)
and the feature is computed as follows:
E(WPitnow) = H(Q1||..||Qm)
where Q1||..||Qm is a concatenation of the fully qualified
domain names in the log lines of WPitnow .
2) IP-Hostname Exchange RR Type Distribution: Accord-
ing to [15], 99.4% of the requested resource records (RRs)
are of the following types: A (IPv4), AAAA (IPv6), and PTR
(reverse lookup pointers). Given the main function of DNS
as the ”phonebook of the Internet”4, it would make sense
to assume that RR types that relate domains to IP addresses
represent the vast majority of DNS lookups. However, these
RRs are restricted to a short response length (i.e., up to the
length of an IP address) compared to other RR types (e.g.,
TXT, SRV), and thus the distribution of RR types may be
different in a domain used for data exchange. The feature
we create computes the rate of A and AAAA records for per
domain in time, i.e.,
NI(WPitnow) =
∑
W
Pi
tnow
|(T=”A”∧T=”AAAA”) 1∑
W
Pi
tnow
1
.
3) Unique Query Ratio: A domain whose subdomains are
used as messages is not likely to repeat them. Therefore, when
comparing domains used for exfiltration to normal domains we
expect to see a much higher unique query ratio for the latter.
The feature is computed as follows:
Uniq(WPitnow) =
|{Q|Q ∈WPitnow}|∑
W
Pi
tnow
1
.
4) Unique Query Volume: In a normal setting, DNS traffic
is rather sparse as responses are largely cached within the stub
resolver. However, in the case of data exchange over the DNS,
the domain-specific traffic is expected to avoid cache by non-
repeating messages, or short time-to-live in order for the data
to make it to the attacker’s server. Avoiding cache as well
a lengthy data exchange, might result in a higher volume of
requests compared to a normal setting. The feature is computed
as follows:
V ol(WPitnow) = |{Q|Q ∈WPitnow}| .
5) Query Length Average: As a complementary to the
volume feature and given a query size limitation, there is a
trade-off between the volume of queries and their length, hence
making it an effective feature for detection.
6) Longest Meaningful Word Over Domain Length Aver-
age: For each primary domain, each subdomain is decomposed
to its hierarchy labels ordered by their length. Starting from the
longest to the shortest substring, an English dictionary word
lookup is performed over the current substring. If the lookup
succeeds (i.e., the substring is a valid English word) - the
length of the substring is taken as the longest meaningful word
(LMW) length. This length is then divided by the length of
the subdomain and averaged out over all of the subdomains.
While English is not the only language used on the Internet,
this may help distinguish domains with a large number of to
domains to either readable, or non-readable.
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain Name System
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F. DNS Data Exchange Detection
The detection of DNS data exchange for an input feature
vector is computed using an anomaly detection model, namely,
Isolation Forest [21]. The Isolation Forest model is a one-
class classifier (i.e. trained only on existing legitimate data)
and can detect anomalous behavior on future data. Therefore,
two aspects should be discussed here: (1) training the model
and (2) applying the model on new data.
The training phase takes a set of previously collected
feature vectors and outputs an anomaly model, which is
essentially a function that acts on a sample and outputs an
anomaly score. In our case, the input to the model is the set
WPit for every domain i and for t at a specific time period
(e.g., the previous day) and the output is the anomaly score
ranging from 0 to 1. The anomaly score is a function of the
contamination rate, denoted as ν, which refers to the fraction
of noise in the data. The output of the training phase is the
anomaly model together with Ts, the anomaly score threshold,
which will be applied on new data.
As a new sample arrives, the model is applied to it such
that each sample is assigned with a score, s, using a function
iforest, as follows:
iforest
(
fe
(
WPitnow
))
= s , (2)
where fe is the feature extraction function from Eq. 1 that
translates a sample to a feature vector. If the score exceeds
the anomaly score (i.e., s > Ts), the sample is considered
anomalous and the domain it refers to will be marked as a
domain used for data exchange over the DNS.
G. Blocking Malicious Domains
As mentioned before, domains that are anomalous in terms
of traffic (i.e., used for data exchange) can be divided into
two categories: malicious and legitimate. Generally, when
the system is deployed in a network it will readily find the
legitimate (and possibly also illegitimate) services that use
DNS for data exchange. Once these domains are mapped and
removed by a security expert, any new domain that comes up
in the anomaly detection phase is considered malicious data
exfiltration and blocked immediately.
V. EVALUATION
The evaluation focuses on two primary goals: the detection
of low throughput malware exfiltration, and the detection of
high throughput DNS tunneling. To that end, we introduce
our dataset of DNS traffic (see subsection V-A) comprised
of benign traffic as well as DNS exfiltration test subjects
(see subsection V-B). The test subjects include: (1) Iodine
and (2) Dns2tcp (as high-throughput tunneling tools), and
(3) FrameworkPOS and (4) Backdoor.Win32.Denis (as DNS
exfiltration malware).
The detection and false positive rates for the proposed
method are reviewed for each of the test subjects when
placing a strong limit on the acceptable false positive rate
parameter (i.e., less than 2∗10−5). Based on a manual use-case
classification conducted on the false positive detection (see
Table VI), we conclude that the majority of false positive
domains fall under the use-case of legitimate data exchange
over the DNS (e.g., Antivirus signature lookup) and should
therefore be white-listed by a security expert upon detection
in order to prevent future false alarms. Therefore, given that
former are white-listed, we analyze the false positive rates over
time (instead of per domain) by measuring the number of new
falsely detected domains per day (see section V-D).
Furthermore, the proposed method is compared with re-
implementations of two recently published methods [6], [16],
that are designed for the detection of tunneling in order to
measure the effectiveness on our test subjects that include
of both tunneling and malware. This comparison is the basis
for suggesting that avoiding a malware evaluation in previous
works is not an additional overlooked test, but rather an undealt
case.
A. Dataset
Our main dataset (denoted as DS) is a single week of
DNS traffic collected from a subset of recursive DNS resolvers
operated by Akamai Technologies. DS is considered as a
large-scale DNS traffic sample with at least a hundred thousand
end-users, 35 million hourly requests on average with a stan-
dard deviation of 74 million hourly requests (further statistics
appear in Table V).
Arguably, this makes DS an ideal candidate for the eval-
uation of our proposed method on large-scale DNS traffic. In
contrast, both of the recent works that we use for comparison
were originally designed and evaluated on small-scale DNS
traffic. The evaluation of both works on the large-scale dataset,
DS, yielded sub-par results that were significantly different
from their reported results, even for the DNS tunneling class.
Therefore, to conduct an additional fair test, we introduce
DSpartial. DSpartial contains the traffic of a subset of DS
users’ traffic. Therefore, it is slightly smaller than one tenth of
DS, thus making it more suitable for comparison with prior
research.
TABLE V. DATASETS DESCRIPTION OF HOURLY QUERIES
mean std min median max
DS 3.5 · 107 7.8 · 106 2.2 · 107 3.7 · 107 4.7 · 107
DSpartial 2.9 · 106 4.9 · 105 1.8 · 106 2.7 · 106 4.0 · 106
During the single week of DNS traffic of which DS and
DSpartial are composed, we have injected the traffic of real
malware communication and DNS tunneling tools which will
be used to test model but not to train it (this will be fully
explained in subsection V-B). Due to the scarcity of data
exchange over the DNS, we can assume that aside from our
injected traffic there are no additional DNS data exchange
cases on either dataset.
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Each of the domains within the DS dataset is represented
as a feature vector, as displayed in subsection IV-E. The
first day included in DS, which is presumed to contain
only clean traffic, is explored in Figure 3. As discussed in
subsection IV-B1, we expect domains that are used for data
exfiltration to have corresponding feature vectors that are
appear as outliers with regards to normal domains’ feature
vectors. For example: Iodine DNS tunneling has a mean query
length that is larger than 100 characters whereas less than
0.01 of normal domains behave in this manner. Also, with
Iodine’s default encoding set to Base128, the character entropy
normally exceeds 3.0 whereas in the case of clean traffic less
than 0.05 of the traffic follows this behavior.
Fig. 3. The probability density function (PDF) for each of the extracted
features on the first day included in the dataset (presumed to contain no
attacks).
B. Test Subjects
There are four test subjects which will be tested against
compared previous works and the proposed method. All of
them are direct simulations of DNS tunneling software and
DNS exfiltration malware as executed “in the wild.” Although
this relatively small number is not ideal for the evaluating the
detection rate (e.g., using a receiver operating characteristic
curve), it is the most unbiased way of testing these methods.
1) FrameworkPOS: The FrameworkPOS malware [32] was
used in a targeted attack on the American retailer, Home
Depot, back in 2014. Over the course of six months, the
malware leaked information associated with not less than
56,000,000 credit card account numbers. The malware operates
autonomously such that it extracts newly available credit
card information from the compromised machine’s memory,
encodes the data and sends it to a remote server. The data is
sent using a DNS query to a dedicated domain of the form:
〈encoded credit card〉.domain.com. Although Framework-
POS’ C&C server was shut down after the Home Depot
campaign, the details mentioned above allow us to construct
an accurate simulation.
Our simulation of FrameworkPOS consists of a ded-
icated domain (simply referred to as frameworkpos.com.)
Using this domain, we output DNS queries of the form:
〈encoded credit card〉.frameworkpos.com at an average
rate of three queries per second (proportional to 56 million
credit card account numbers in six months). Also, the queries’
resource record type is set to “A” (IPv4 request) as was done
in the Home Depot campaign.
2) Backdoor.Win32.Denis: The Trojan malware Back-
door.Win32.Denis [1] (referred to as Denis in this paper) was
discovered by Kaspersky Labs in 2017. Before its discovery,
Denis was used in Operation Cobalt Kitty, a large-scale APT
in Asia [8]. Throughout its execution, it enables an intruder
to manipulate the file system, run arbitrary commands and
run loadable modules. In contrast to FrameworkPOS (see
subsection V-B1) which uses the DNS as a payload delivery
channel, Denis uses the DNS as a bidirectional communication
channel with its C&C server. It has 16 predefined instructions
to allow the C&C operator to take control of a compromised
machine.
Among these instructions is a “keep-alive” instruction that
is sent routinely throughout Denis’ execution. This keep-alive
instruction is manifested as a query with a “NULL” resource
record type approximately every 1.5 seconds, and it contains
the ID of the compromised machine and a unique identifier to
reach the C&C server regardless of DNS caching.
Based on the above, the simulation of Denis consists of
a dedicated domain (z.teriava.com) and DNS queries of the
form:
vL0VugAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAvV5.z.teriava.com
where the last three characters of the subdomain act as an
anti-caching mechanism. The queried resource record type is
NULL (i.e., to allow a longer answer than an IPv4 address)
and the requests are sent every 1.5 seconds exactly as took
place in the Cobalt Kitty operation’s security report analysis.
3) Iodine: Iodine is an open-source DNS tunneling tool. It
is commonly used to bypass Wi-Fi payment by browsing the
Internet over the DNS. Our use, for evaluation purposes, is a
single hour of Web browsing through a SOCKS proxy that is
tunneled over the DNS using Iodine.
4) Dns2Tcp: Similarly to Iodine, Dns2tcp is also an open-
source tunneling tool. It is commonly used to tunnel general
purpose TCP sessions. The Dns2tcp use case in our evaluation
was a download of a 30-kilobyte file from an FTP server.
C. Detection Rate
The model is trained in an unsupervised learning manner,
and is never exposed to attacks during its training. Aside
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from the comfort of not having to set labels for the training
process and the analysis, a successful detection rate for both
tunneling and malware will imply the model well generalizes
the problem of detecting both classes.
The training phase of our method is applied to the first
day of the DS dataset, which only contains benign traffic.
For the sake of efficiency, instead of training over 24 · 3.5 ·
107 ≈ 8.4 ·108 records, we discard primary domains with less
than ten sub-domains in the last λ · ns minutes from both the
training and the execution phases. Although this filter ignores
exfiltration at a rate lesser than 2.5kb per ns · λ (at most 10
queries of 255 bytes each), we manage to reduce our training
set to 2.1 · 105, i.e., 0.25% of its original size.
The time window model parameters are set to ns = 6, λ =
60, thus the method remains capable of detecting attacks that
are as slow as 0.11b/s and under a worse case analysis will
block and report their activity up to six hours after their first
collected data. Effectively however, for two real-life malware
that are evaluated in section V they are caught immediately
within the first λ minutes following their execution.
The acceptable false positive rate is set to ν = 2 · 10−5,
i.e., it will only detect domains that are at least as anomalous
as the four most anomalous domains in the benign traffic. The
training phase with the above parameters yields an anomaly
score threshold of Ts = 0.653. Based on the output model and
Ts, we apply the model to new traffic in DS that was not used
for training.
The execution phase of the model works likewise. Every
λ = 60 minutes, domains that had at least ten subdomains
within the last λ ∗ ns = 360 minutes become candidates for
classification. The candidate domains’ logs are transformed
to feature vectors as described in Section IV and the model
assigns them an anomaly score. Based on the training phase,
domains whose anomaly score exceeds T0.653 will be regarded
as domains that are used for exfiltration and will be immedi-
ately blocked.
The first part of our method evaluation focuses on the
rate of successfully detected test subjects. The anomaly score
for each of the test subjects is sampled every λ minutes as
of the traffic injection start. The expected result is for every
test subject’s anomaly score to exceed the given Ts = 0.653
threshold in at least a single sample in order to be regarded as a
successful detection. The results presented in Figure 4 indicate
that all of the test subjects that were successfully detected by
our method during their execution.
D. False Positives Rate
In addition to evaluating the detection rate (see subsec-
tion V-C), we focus on evaluating the rate of false positives.
Because our method classifies domains within a discrete time
period (i.e., λ · ns minutes), we attempt to evaluate it based
on the overall number of domains that were mis-classified as
malicious exfiltration. For that task, we use the DS dataset. In
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Fig. 4. The anomaly score of the domains corresponding to Dns2tcp, Iodine,
FrameworkPOS and Backdoor.Win32.Denis over time. The horizontal dashed
line stands for anomaly score threshold (i.e., Ts = 0.653) when trained with
an acceptable rate of false positives set to ν = 2 · 10−5, ns = 6, λ = 60.
the same manner used in the detection rate evaluation, we train
on the traffic data from the first day included in DS and apply
our model to the rest of the traffic included in DS. The number
of new false positive domains over time drops significantly and
converges to at most a single domain per day only after only
two days in which the model was used for classification (see
Figure 5).
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Fig. 5. The number of new mis-classified domains (referred to as false
positives) per day. The first day of traffic included in DS to which the model
is applied is regarded as zero.
The list of mis-classified domains is mainly comprised of
legitimate security services that mis-use the DNS protocol for
data exchange (see Table VI for a summarized categorization
of falsely detected domains). In our evalaution these domains
are regarded as false positives, even though they are clearly
used for data exchange, because they are assumed to be
intentionally installed by the user and should therefore not
be blocked. In a real-world implementation, one can assemble
a whitelist of these domains before applying the automatic
blocking, in order to avoid false shutdown of legitimate ser-
vices.
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TABLE VI. CLASSIFICATION OF FALSE DETECTIONS
Category Frequency Examples
Security Services Lookups 12 out of 18
sophosxl.net,
l2.nessus.org,
avts.mcafee.com,
a.e.e5.sk
General Services Lookups 4 out of 18
kr0.io,
dsipsl.net,
drtst.com,
dsipsl.net
Others (*) 2 out of 18
jacksonriverdev.com,
groupinfra.com
(*) primary domains with a large number of subdomains
E. Comparison with Prior Research
After evaluating our method’s detection rate (see sub-
section V-C) and false positives rate (see subsection V-D),
we compare our method to methods proposed in recently
published works.
1) Feature Transformation and Mutual Information for
DNS Tunneling Analysis: Cambiasso et al. [6] (denoted as
C16) measures the mutual information (MI) of transformed
features once in every 10,000 DNS queries. In the case of a
sufficiently low MI, the model implies the existence of a DNS
tunnel.
The comparison is based on an implementation of C16 over
the DS dataset, consisting of slightly more than 10,000 users.
Apart from the MI threshold that was re-adjusted due to noise
in our network, the other configurable parameters are set to
ns = 10000, r = 500, α =
1
1000 exactly as reported in C16. In
addition, because C16 was initially designed for medium-scale
DNS traffic we test it on the DSpartial dataset, which includes
all of the test subjects present on the DS dataset but contains
less than one tenth of its traffic.
The results of C16 with FrameworkPOS, Denis, and the
DNS tunneling tools are presented in Figure V-E1). Each of
the full-line plotted functions represents the MI over time,
such that an MI below the dashed horizontal line represents
DNS tunneling. While the results point to the clear detection
of the high throughput tunneling cases (Iodine, Dns2tcp),
the traffic of FrameworkPOS and Denis malware remains
indistinguishable from clean traffic.
2) Entropy-based Prediction of Network Protocols in the
Forensic Analysis of DNS Tunnels: Homem et al. [16] (denoted
as H16) is designed to distinguish DNS tunneling from clean
traffic based on the mean differences (referred to as “Mean-
Diff”) between the normal average entropy (µX ) and that of
the latest N packets (µY ). The calculation of MeanDiff for
each sample of N packets (Y ) is computed as follows:
m(X,Y ) = |µX − µY | . (3)
A classifier is then trained on the single feature m(X,Y )
to determine if a new series of packets, Y , includes a tunnel.
Because a concrete threshold, t, is not mentioned (e.g., Y is
a DNS tunnel if and only if m(X,Y ) > t), we assume that t
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Fig. 6. The smoothed mutual information measure (y-axis) of transformed
features per feature index (x-axis). The feature index increments every 10,000
DNS queries and refers (in a sliding window) to the most recent 5M DNS
queries. The plotted functions represents 5,000 feature indices (i.e., 50M DNS
requests) of clean traffic, FrameworkPOS, Backdoor.Win32.Denis, Iodine and
Dns2TCP. The horizontal dashed line (y=0.05) is the upper threshold for DNS
tunneling detection.
is at least as large as the standard deviation of benign traffic
entropy to avoid over-sensitivity of the model. For the sake of
setting a threshold that will match our traffic, we calculate the
standard deviation of query names entropy (σX ) using a set of
50,000 query names without any tunneling:
σX = 0.5369 (4)
Based on that, we now assume that any series of packets will
not be regarded as a tunnel if m(X,Y ) ≤ σX . Although
we assume the classifier’s threshold is more restrictive (i.e.,
significantly larger than σX ), the above assumption assists us
make a point about the possible detection of low throughput
malware.
The evaluation of H16 was initially performed on twenty
network captures of an unknown size. We test it on the
DSpartial dataset to allow it to become more sensitive (as the
legitimate traffic proportion is decreased by 90% compared to
DS). The results on the test subjects in DSpartial appear in
Figure 7. We evaluate X based on 50,000 packets resulting in
µX = 3.558 and 2,000 packets for each Y test subject.
The summarized results of H16 appear in Table VII.
Recalling the standard deviation value (Eq. 4), we see that
while the DNS tunneling tools generate MeanDiff values over
3σ, the values for the exfiltration malware are well within the
standard deviation and are therefore undetectable using this
method.
F. Summary of the Results and Comparison with Prior Re-
search
To summarize, we used a single week of DNS traffic logs
which were injected with the traffic of four test subjects, in
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Fig. 7. The query name entropy per query name over a series of 2,000
consecutive queries of clean traffic combined with Dns2tcp (upper left), Iodine
(upper right), Backdoor.Win32.Denis (lower-left), and FrameworkPOS (lower-
right).
TABLE VII. MEANDIFF VALUE OF ENTROPY BASED ON H16
Detection Experiment MeanDiff
Backdoor.Win32.Denis 0.017118
FrameworkPOS 0.103525
Iodine 1.670904
Dns2tcp 1.684665
order to compare our method of with two recently published
methods, namely C16 and H16. The expected results was a
successful detection of all subjects that simulated the follow-
ing:
1) Web browsing over the DNS using Iodine
2) File transfer over the DNS using Dns2tcp
3) Credit card account number theft using FrameworkPOS
malware
4) Trojan communication over DNS using Back-
door.Win32.Denis malware
A summary of the results (Table VIII) shows that our pro-
posed method effectively detected all of the above scenarios.
However, while C16 and H16 successfully detected the first
two DNS tunneling scenarios, they did not at all detect last
two DNS exfiltration malware scenarios.
TABLE VIII. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Case Study Proposed Method C16 [6] H16 [16]
Iodine (Web Browsing) Yes Yes Yes
Dns2Tcp (File Transfer) Yes Yes Yes
FrameworkPOS
(Credit Card Acount Number Theft) Yes No No
Backdoor.Win32.Denis
(Trojan Communication) Yes No No
VI. DISCUSSION
Detecting DNS exfiltration performed by a malware is a
difficult challenge. In the results presented, we demonstrate
that previous works aimed at detecting DNS tunneling over-
looked this issue and are therefore ineffective in the face of
this challenge. The main limitation of the methods proposed in
previous works lies in both the relatively short data collection
phase and the use of per time or per user classification.
The results indicate that our proposed method tackles the
problem successfully by collecting per domain queries during
a predefined window of recent traffic.
Moreover, the per domain approach allows our method to
perform an automatic shut down of the data leakage. This
automatic blocking can be highly effective for networks in
which performing routine manual analysis and investigations
of the results may be exhaustive.
VII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
The ability to detect data leakage in a secure network
is crucial and challenging, particularly when leaked over the
DNS protocol which is less often monitored and restricted.
While the problem has been studied extensively, prior work has
largely only focused on a specific class of DNS data leakage,
namely DNS tunneling, while leaving the important class of
DNS exfiltration malware responsible for leaking millions of
stolen credit cards and user credentials in the past decade
unaddressed.
In this paper we suggest a method based on anomaly
detection, which is capable of detecting both DNS tunneling
and DNS exfiltration malware. The proposed method’s novelty
arises from two points. The first is its inspection of recent
history rather than a short time window which may be ineffi-
cient for low throughput exfiltration. The second point is our
method’s inspection based on primary domains, which allows
filtering of legitimate services that exchange data over the DNS
as well as an automatic blocking of the data leak immediately
after detection.
The evaluation of our work is validated on two DNS
tunneling tools and two DNS exfiltration malware injected in
large-scale DNS traffic. These test subjects are evaluated on
our work and compared with two recently published methods
in order to demonstrate our method’s ability in detecting both
classes (DNS tunneling tools and DNS exfiltration malware).
The main limitations of the method are the assumptions of
a (1) single and (2) dedicated domain per malware or tunneling
tool (see subsection IV-B). While reasonable, as no malware
detected up to the day of writing broke these assumptions,
they are not binding. That is, it is possible for a malware to
compromise a legitimate domain such that shutting it down
using our system will require denying legitimate queries as
well as malicious ones. Dealing with this challenge of a data
leakage payload that is distributed over queries to different
domains and/or uses a compromised domain is proposed for
future work.
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